Exploring Possibilities for Offensive Operations Against Iran
The original version of this paper, complete with references, is available in Word format here.
Since the countries of the Middle East learned to parlay their reserves of fossil fuels into disproportionate power on the world stage, American foreign policy has been concerned with maintaining stability in the region. Due to prevailing political conditions and public sentiment, this policy has been half-witted at best. The United States has done an excellent job of setting in motion solutions to various problems. Unfortunately, we have done a terrible job of seeing these solutions to a successful finish. Nowhere is this problem more apparent than in the case of Iran.
In 1953 the U.S. government played a large role in deposing the democratically elected Mohammad Mosaddegh in a bid to reverse the nationalization of Iran’s oil industry. Beginning with this coup and leading up to the present day, our policies toward the Persian homeland have been a chronicle of impotence and false starts. Conversely, Iran’s popular sentiment has moved to oppose the United States, leading to a revolution, the increasing radicalization of Iranian policy, and a gravely unstable situation affecting events from Israel to American patrols in Iraq and beyond.
These dangerous circumstances necessitate swift action in the form of overt offensive operations by the United States against the Islamic Republic of Iran. Owing both to the American military’s unsurpassed professionalism and recent experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, we are uniquely prepared to face Iran’s measurably inferior armed forces. The Iranian military suffers from a logistical and technological disadvantage, as they have not had their capabilities tested since the Iran-Iraq war. Though they operate in familiar, admittedly demanding terrain, we can negate the effects of the physical environment by avoiding mistakes made in Iraq. Iran’s geography looks even more favorable for our purposes when we consider that more than two thirds of the country lives in concentrated urban centers and the rural population is falling with every year. This mitigates all the problems associated with fighting a war in unfamiliar mountainous territory.
With the advantage of the physical environment removed and in view of Iran’s disastrous economic policies, there is little to stop U.S. forces from winning not only the military battle but also the support of the Iranian people. Due to Iran’s isolation from a significant number of Western countries, effective leveraging of American interests abroad can provide Iranian society with a slew of previously non-existent international relationships, a strong incentive to cease any remaining support for the current Iranian regime.
Our recent experience in conducting counter-insurgency operations would certainly play a role in any offensive action against Iran, but leading up to any effort at stabilization would be a decisive defeat of Iran’s military in conventional combat. Although considered to be the most powerful military in the region, Iranian forces lack a cohesive air defense network and the only airborne early warning (AWACS) aircraft in their inventory crashed in 2009. In view of this combined with the United States’ technical and tactical superiority, a conventional warfare victory would be almost certain, a matter of several long-range precision air strikes to neutralize Iran’s most important military sites and eliminate any command and control capabilities, coupled with a swift ground campaign.
This would leave Iran to rely on its doctrinal emphasis on asymmetric warfare. The Iranian military’s specialized elements conduct large amounts of training in hit-and-run tactics and sabotage on foreign soil. However, morale among the invariably conscripted soldiers, even those within the Republican Guard, remains low and efforts at religious indoctrination are generally seen as amateurish according to first-hand accounts. The result is that only a small percentage of troops would remain genuinely committed to defending Iran in the face of an American invasion. After a decisive defeat of Iran’s forces in conventional offensive operations, the Iranian military could be redirected under American control to conduct stability and political operations instead of being disbanded, a mistake that cost Coalition forces dearly in post-invasion Iraq. This would leave elements such as the Basij, a paramilitary volunteer force with little in terms of logistical support or modern military equipment, as the bulk of the opposition to American occupying forces. However, it’s doubtful that even these forces would maintain any lasting interest in propping up a disintegrating regime.
Those combatants too hardened ideologically to cooperate with U.S. forces would certainly have the advantage of arduous terrain on their side. However, this advantage is not as great as it appears at first glance. Although the Alborz and Zagros mountain ranges dominate much of Iran, the nation’s major cities are located on flatlands or in natural basins. As a result of increasing urbanization, 71% of the population is concentrated in easily accessible towns and cities. These cities have historically dominated the basins surrounding them, leaving only tribes with no interest in preserving the status quo living in the mountains. This, coupled with the fact that Iran has over 100,000 miles of paved road, ranking 28th in the world, means that most combat and follow-on stability operations would take place on relatively favorable terrain with few challenges to logistics. This assessment holds up in view of the easy successes of a British invading force that gained a foothold in the Persian Gulf city of Abadan in 1941 and secured the country for allied interests in conjunction with Soviet forces attacking from the north.
The most important issue regarding Iran’s geography, then, becomes assuring the security of shipping through the strategically vital Strait of Hormuz and Persian Gulf. The Strait of Hormuz, which sees the passage of 17% of the world’s oil shipments, is vital globally as well as regionally. At a narrow 34 miles in width, the passageway is relatively easy for Iran to obstruct, an obstacle that could cause worldwide financial panic. Fortunately, the city of Bandar Abbas, a port located on the Strait, provides all the facilities needed to secure safe passage for shipping through the area. In fact, as the headquarters of the Iranian Navy and with its own international airport, Bandar Abbas would serve well as a beachhead for American forces entering the country.
By occupying Bandar Abbas and gaining a second point of entry through Abadan on the Persian Gulf, a major area of oil production in Iran, American forces could simultaneously secure strategic oil reserves in the area, ensure the continuous operation of shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, and provide a point from which to defend American allies Kuwait and Iraq. Not only would this put U.S. forces in excellent position to continue an offensive and maintain supply lines, but it would set the stage for a better economic future for Iran, a factor whose importance cannot be underestimated when assessing the possibility of a stable Iran requiring no American intervention.
Oil production and the removal of the Revolutionary Guards from control of major industries are the keys to the future stability and prosperity of Iran. As the third largest holder of proven oil reserves in the world, Iran relies in large part on this sector to keep its economy afloat. Revenues generated here fund the public sector and provide subsidies, most of which benefit the upper strata of Iran’s society. This leaves a large swath of the population unhappy with their economic lot in life but presents a situation primed for reform. As a result of the Iranian government’s refusal to privatize heavy industry within the country and the fact that the Revolutionary Guards hold industrial interests accounting for one third of the economy, the nation suffers from unemployment above 13%.
An American invasion would allow for the removal of the inefficient public sector administration. Not only would this remove some of economic leverage held by the more extreme elements in the Iranian military and government, but it would also open the door to private sector growth. In a free-market environment, Iranians would be free to invest in the latest technology to make the production and refining of fossil fuels and their products more efficient. In turn, the distribution of profits from the oil industry would serve to benefit a larger segment of the population, instead of limiting returns to the privileged classes and funneling most profits into the black hole of a bloated public sector. With the need for international sanctions gone, Iran’s people could also benefit from international investments, going from what is a position of partial isolation to being able to leverage American relationships around the world.
This would be the first time since the Islamic revolution in 1979 that Iran has normal relations with the United States. Although it maintains trade relations with nations around the world, Iran’s primary influence on the world stage, aside from its oil reserves, is through the sponsorship of terrorist groups on foreign soil under the auspices of the Revolutionary Guards’ Quds Force. These groups have affected American interests both directly and indirectly. Iran has assisted organizations ranging from Hezbollah in Israel to the Taliban in Afghanistan and Shiite militias in Iraq, resulting directly in the deaths of American service members in the two latter cases.
This willingness to help disrupt foreign nations’ internal affairs and Iran’s continual refusal to submit to International Atomic Energy Agency rules have resulted in a bevy of sanctions levied by the United Nations, individual countries and other supranational organizations. Although these sanctions have not closed off Iran from the world entirely, they have severely limited the number of foreign nations who would come to its aid in the event of an invasion.
This number grows even smaller in the event of an invasion by American forces specifically. Iran’s most powerful supporter, China, is willing to supply the Islamic state with military equipment and expertise. This policy has long put it at odds with American interests. However, China has too much interest in maintaining normal relations with its largest trading partner, the United States, to make serious attempts at direct aid to anyone facing off directly against American forces.
Other interested parties, such as Cuba and Venezuela, maintain even stronger ties with Iran. However, these ties primarily deal with economic, scientific and technological development, and lack the sort of military cooperation that would warrant any concern for an invading American military. Even if either Cuba or Venezuela were interested in pursuing a confrontation with U.S. forces on Iranian soil, neither country maintains the sort of force projection capabilities needed to do this. Where in other conflicts countries like Cuba and Venezuela might rely on a powerful third party such as China for logistical support, as we’ve seen this is not a practical option in this case.
The result would be a situation where the only supporters ardent enough to come to Iran’s aid militarily would be non-state actors such as those terrorist organizations who have gotten a helping hand. Fortunately in this case, not only do they lack the logistics to fight a foreign enemy on foreign land, but they are too involved in their current problems to be of much help. For evidence of this we only need to look at the cases of HAMAS and Hezbollah in Israel and the Israeli-Lebanese border.
Left without any external support, the Iranian regime would quickly succumb to the military power of the United States. With major cities easily controlled by virtue of their topographic nature and the strategic interest points of the Strait of Hormuz and Abadan conveniently located on the easily accessible coastline, the bulk of offensive operations could be concluded relatively quickly. More importantly, the adverse impact on oil production and international shipping could be mitigated through some prior planning and swift execution.
Because of the dual benefits of freeing Iran’s economy from over-centralization and removing the Republican Guards’ death grip on industry within the country, Iran’s population and conventional armed forces would not be likely to put up any significant resistance. With the less extreme elements of the military and security forces available to assist U.S. forces in re-introducing stability throughout the country following an American military victory, the pitfalls of a protracted counterinsurgency as seen in Iraq and Afghanistan could be avoided and the re-building of a modern Iranian state could begin more quickly.
In addition, with the problems of unemployment and unequal division of income alleviated by the availability of a viable private sector encompassing all the industries the authoritarian regime currently controls, the lack of stability inherent in a disillusioned and under-employed population could be avoided. The result would be a withdrawal of support for terrorist organizations fighting American interests and friendly nations worldwide, and an Iran willing and able to deal with the outside world in a productive and rational manner.
